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This brief paper describes a plan to restructure the relationship between state-
supported colleges and universities and the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Since 2001, 
state-supported colleges and universities have had to absorb significant budget cuts as the 
state brought its expenditures in line with its revenues.  The institutions have been 
allowed to raise tuition to soften the effect of these budget cuts.  As a result, the 
percentage of each institution’s budget supported by state general fund appropriations has 
declined.  We have been here before. 
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The figure above shows the recent history of the percentage of Education and 
General (E&G) expenditures supported by state general fund appropriations for the 
College of William and Mary.  While the levels would vary by institution, the general 
shape of the line is similar for any state-supported institution.   The figure shows that 
state support falls as a share of expenditures during and after recessions (1982-1984, 
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1990-1991, and 2001- 200?).  The share of state support recovers during cyclical 
expansions but, perhaps surprisingly, not to its previous levels.  The result is that the 
share of state support has ratcheted down over time.   
 
This picture does not bring smiles to the faces on campuses or at the state capitol.  
The pattern it shows does not suggest evil intent on anyone’s part.  It reflects the 
combination of four forces:  (1) periodic declines in state revenues, (2) legitimate 
demands on state revenues for purposes other than supporting higher education, (3) a 
requirement to balance the biannual state budget, and (4) the fact that increases in college 
tuition are politically more palatable than increases in other state revenues.  The figure 
shows clearly how colleges and universities have become progressively more dependent 
on direct charges to students and support from private donors.  The forces driving this 
change are not likely to stop.  It is time for all the parties to recognize this and manage 
the changes these forces imply.  
 
When the percentage of state support declines below 50% college administrators 
are inclined to say they are “state-assisted rather than state-supported.”  This semantic 
distinction is not very useful, because it does not describe any real change in the 
relationship between the state and the institution.  In this paper, we describe a plan to 
create a real difference between what we will call a state-allied institution and the current 
state-supported model. This plan would meet the objectives of the state, and of the 
institutions themselves, better than the current system.   
 
 
2. The Foundations of a new Compact for Higher Education in Virginia  
 
State-Allied Institutions as Public-Private Partnerships – The first element of 
the compact is a new model of a state-allied college or university as a public-private 
partnership.  Essentially, each state-allied institution would have to be recreated as a new 
legal entity.  This legal entity would have a governing board partially chosen by the 
governor and partially chosen by the institution.  State-supported colleges and 
universities currently have active private fund raising arms that are, for many purposes, 
completely separate from their state-supported operations.  The new legal entity would 
combine the private and state portions of the current institutions.  The legal details and 
protections associated with this combination are beyond the scope of this paper, but we 
do not believe that they include any deal breakers.   
 
This new creation – the state-allied institution – would receive private funds in the 
form of donations and tuition.  The major change involves tuition.  Tuition payments 
currently are state revenue, called non-general fund revenue.  This would not be true 
under the new arrangement.  This change is important for two reasons.  First, since tuition 
payments are state revenue, there are no guarantees that the institution will be able to use 
them.  In times of budget duress, the state can claim any state revenue.  This makes it 
very hard for institutions to plan and is very damaging to the educational program when 
the state has to claim these funds.  
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Colleges and universities operate in markets that mix private and public 
institutions.  These markets have little respect for state boundaries, and they are very 
dependent on easily transferred human talent.  College personnel can teach, perform 
research, or serve as administrators at private institutions and at state-supported 
institutions in other states.  Our publicly supported institutions also compete with major 
corporations, banks, law firms, and a myriad other private and public sector employers.   
Talented individuals are mobile, and when state budget necessities keep salaries fixed 
and facilities in disrepair they are more likely to move.  Virginia’s budget problems often 
coincide with fiscal difficulties in other states, but they are not shared evenly, and private 
colleges and universities are exempt from most of the problems.   
 
The fact that colleges and universities are so dependent on people with mobile 
talents makes life at a state-supported institution like a roller coaster ride.  When state 
resources are flowing, institutions build new programs, hire very talented faculty and 
administrators, and increase educational opportunities for their students.  When resource 
flows slow or reverse, programs have to be eliminated, the faculty and administrators the 
institution most wants to keep may leave, and the educational opportunities for students 
dry up.  The uncertainty the state budget process introduces makes long range planning 
difficult, which complicates the institution's problems in maintaining or increasing the 
quality of its programs. 
 
Second, since tuition payments are state revenue, the state, for political reasons, 
can control tuition levels.  We believe that tuition should be viewed as a price, and it is 
not usually a good idea to set prices politically.  Central control of tuition, through 
freezes and reductions, is a relatively new phenomenon in Virginia.  And yet in its short 
history, central control already has created problems.  State budget procedures call for 
institutions to submit a set of new initiatives for possible state funding.  When institutions 
controlled their own tuition, they could plan ahead to ensure that sufficient revenues were 
available to incorporate any state-funded new initiatives without having to constrain core 
activities.  After tuition was frozen, however, most incremental funding was tied to new 
initiatives.  The result of a few years of this practice is a quite predictable shortfall in 
funds needed to carry out the basic mission of the state-supported institutions.  In the 
language used in Virginia this is called the “base budget adequacy” problem.   
 
With control of their own tuition, and assurance that they alone could spend 
tuition revenues, institutions could avoid base budget adequacy problems.  In addition, 
the state college system includes institutions with very different missions and that face 
very different market conditions.  A centrally controlled tuition policy is very unlikely to 
have the flexibility to be appropriate for each institution.   
 
 At a national level, the combination of budget stringency coupled with political 
control of tuition increases seriously threatens the quality of public institutions.   For 
every dollar private institutions spend per student, public colleges and universities today 
spend less than 55 cents, down from 70 cents in 1979. 
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Funding Students Not Institutions – To this point, the appeal of the plan to 
institutions is clear.  They get more autonomy to make decisions, in particular decisions 
regarding tuition.  What is in it for the state?  To answer this question, we need to 
describe how the state would fund higher education under a system of state-allied 
institutions.  Our plan calls for the state to fund students directly instead of indirectly as it 
does now. 
 
Currently the commonwealth gives three kinds of assistance to students:  (1) 
need-based financial aid, (2) across-the-board subsidies to in-state students in the form of 
reduced tuition made possible by state appropriations covering operating costs, and (3) 
across-the-board subsidies to all students made possible by state appropriations for 
buildings and other capital.   
 
The first kind of aid generally is available to students from low-income families 
and comes to the student directly.  Through grants and subsidized loans the federal 
government provides a large amount of financial aid.   State funds supplement this aid, 
but need-based financial aid does not represent a very large share of state funding for 
higher education.  Virginia is not very different from most states.  Spending on need-
based financial aid is less than 5% of Virginia appropriation for higher education 
operating costs. 
 
The second kind of aid is the across-the-board subsidy to operating costs that is 
available to any student qualifying for in-state status.  By law, out-of-state students 
attending state-supported colleges and universities in Virginia have to pay an amount that 
meets or exceeds the full operating cost of providing their education.  Because the state 
provides funds directly to the institutions, in-state students pay significantly less than the 
full cost of their education.  In the 2001-2002 academic year the general fund subsidy for 
operating costs for an in-state student averaged over $8,750 at four-year institutions.1  
This subsidy allows the institutions to charge in-state students a significantly lower 
tuition than they charge out-of-state students.  Unlike financial aid, this subsidy is 
available to students regardless of their income.  The last form of aid is the subsidy 
implicit in state funding for campus buildings and other capital projects.  This subsidy is 
provided to all students, in-state and out-of-state.  An institution’s tuition would have to 
be higher if it financed its own buildings. 
 
Our plan calls for the commonwealth to give the first two kinds of aid directly to 
students.  This would change the way the state delivers across-the-board aid for 
operations.  Under our plan every in-state student who enrolls at a state-allied college or 
university would be eligible for a tuition grant.  The size of the tuition grant would be 
determined by the state.  Financially, the proposed system could be equivalent to the 
existing system.  A simple example will help illustrate the change we propose.  In this 
example, the institution currently charges $5,000 to each in-state student.  Under the new 
                                                          
1 All data are from the State Council of Higher Education for the 2001-2002 academic year.  There are 
117,436 full time equivalent in-state students at four-year institutions.  The total general fund expenditures 
at four-year institutions were $1,029,711,084. This yields general funds expenditure of $8,768 per full-time 
equivalent in-state student.  
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system, the institution would raise its in-state tuition to $13,750.  In-state students would 
not be hurt by the change, however, because they would all qualify for a state tuition 
grant of $8,750.  This makes the net tuition charge to the students, the per student costs to 
the state, and the per student revenue of the institutions the same under both systems. 
 
 
     Existing System New Compact 
In-state annual tuition     5,000     13,750 
State appropriation (per student)    8,750           0 
Tuition Grant          0       8,750 
Net Tuition       5,000       5,000 
Revenue (per student)   13,750     13,750 
Cost to the State (per student)    8,750       8,750 
 
 
While the economics of the two systems are very similar, the politics are very 
different.  In the current system, the across-the-board subsidy covering operating costs is 
hidden.  It is given directly to the colleges and universities.  The fact that much of this 
subsidy goes to students from high-income families with little, if any, need for a subsidy 
is not apparent.  Providing the subsidy directly to students will make the choice between 
across-the-board subsidies and need-based financial aid much more transparent.  
 
 In addition, under the current system, college presidents spend quite a bit of time 
lobbying the state to increase their institution’s budget in good times and preserve it in 
bad times.  Perhaps without recognizing it, these college presidents are lobbying for 
increases in the across-the-board subsidy.  If they are successful in obtaining these 
increases, some of the money they obtain may well have gone to increased need-based 
aid.  Under the new compact, the major champions for across-the-board subsidies lose 
their incentive to lobby for this type of aid.  It is quite likely that the mix between need-
based aid and across-the-board subsidies would change in favor of more need-based aid.  
This is something that many experts on financial aid policy have advocated for some 
time. 
 
Shifting the method of subsidization from tuition-reduction to direct student 
grants benefits the Commonwealth in three ways.  First, like the schools themselves the 
Commonwealth has a stake in preserving access to higher education and in maintaining 
the high quality of its institutions.  Under the current system, when the state cuts E&G 
funding, its public universities face an unpleasant set of choices.  At least initially, tuition 
increases rarely recoup the lost revenues, so the quality of their programs begins to suffer.  
If financial aid is not increased, higher tuition shrinks the pool of talented in-state 
students who can afford a university education.  Institutions elsewhere, such as the 
University of Wisconsin, have tried to maintain the quality of their program by reducing 
the quantity of spaces available for in-state students.  Directly reducing access to higher 
education is not an acceptable answer either.  Classifying tuition as school revenue, and 
de-politicizing it, insulates the state’s colleges and universities from much of the harm 
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done by the state financing roller coaster.  In that sense it mitigates the harsh quantity-
quality choice faced by schools in a climate of budget austerity. 
 
Second, the transparency of providing direct student subsidies may help facilitate 
decreases in state spending on higher education when budget pressures dictate.  Reducing 
a subsidy that is paid to every student, some of whom have no demonstrated need, may 
be easier than taking funds away from institutions.  When an institution’s budget is 
reduced, the institution’s representatives, its administration, alumni, and students descend 
upon Richmond lobbying to restore the cuts.  Given that members of the legislature often 
are alumni, these lobbying efforts frequently succeed in moderating or reversing the cuts.  
On the other hand, the same cut could be achieved by reducing the across-the-board 
portion of the student grant while still meeting an accepted percentage of student need.  
Lobbying would still occur, but it would be on behalf of families with high incomes who 
had just lost some of their state subsidy.  While this group would no doubt include many 
students, the transparency of their pleas for a constant subsidy at a time of budget crisis 
would make the argument difficult.   
 
Our proposal makes it clear just what the government is subsidizing when it 
directly funds state-supported institutions.  Nobel Prize winning economist Milton 
Friedman asked the question this way in 1968, “Why should the families in Watts pay 
taxes to subsidize the families in Beverly Hills who send their children to UCLA?”  This 
is a very good question.  We think it will be easier for the state to make clear decisions 
about just how far it wants to reduce its support for higher education if it is clear who 
receives this support and in what form.   
 
The third advantage the tuition grant system offers the state is control over the 
amount of state subsidy each student is eligible to receive.  Under the current system, a 
student can qualify for subsidized in-state tuition for credits well in excess of the number 
needed for graduation, or for his or her third master’s degree.  While education is a good 
thing, the state is not obligated to subsidize multiple degrees at a particular level.  The 
state may wish to limit the number of semester hours for which a particular student is 
eligible to receive a tuition grant.  These limits should be liberal, leaving room for 
mistakes and experimentation, but it is sensible for there to be limits.  At present there is 
no limit on the amount of state subsidy that goes to individual students. 
 
  Adopting tuition grants as the only form of state support for operating expenses 
will change the incentives facing institutions in many ways.  For example, the proposed 
system treats institutional growth quite differently than the existing system.  Currently, an 
institution that chooses to grow does so at some peril because its state appropriation may 
not grow as rapidly as its student body.  If the state appropriation does not increase with 
growth in in-state students, it is not to the financial advantage for an institution to 
increase the number of in-state students it admits.  On the other hand, there is no financial 
penalty for growth in the out-of-state student body.  As a result, the current system has an 
incentive for institutions to decrease the percentage of their student body coming from 
the Commonwealth.  Because of this, in some instances, institutions are planning to meet 
the current budget cuts by trying to attract more out-of-state students.  The proposed 
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system changes this.  If the state made a commitment to fund tuition grants for all in-state 
students, growth in in-state students would be, from a financial viewpoint, as beneficial 
as growth in out-of-state students. 
 
If the Commonwealth made an open-ended commitment to fund tuition grants, the 
incentives for institutional growth would be quite strong.  More likely, and preferably, the 
state would limit the number of grants for each institution.  These limits should be set 
several years in advance both to make the Commonwealth’s financial commitments more 
predictable and to enhance the institution’s ability to plan for any growth.  Also, the 
discussion surrounding the projected size of an institution’s student body would allow the 
state to coordinate plans for capital projects needed for the institution to accommodate 
planned growth. 
 
 Determining the size of the tuition grant will be difficult.  There is some appeal to 
the notion that the tuition grants should be the same for all institutions.  In this case the 
system will be very simple to explain to prospective students.  This is unlikely to be 
accepted by institutions because the current size of the per-student across-the-board 
subsidy varies considerably by institution.  Institutions will argue that it would be unfair 
for all institutions to have the same tuition grant because it is more expensive to produce 
certain educational programs, for example Ph.D. programs, than it is others.  This means 
that a system based on tuition grants that differs by type of institution (tiers) is likely to 
be the fairest system.   
 
The classification of institutions into tiers will be politically very sensitive, but we 
think that it is possible to create such a system, especially if the schools that currently 
receive the smallest per-student appropriation from the state see an increase in the new 
system.  It will be important for the system to recognize occasional changes in the 
mission of institutions, but it is also important for these changes to be made as part of a 
state approved plan for the system of education.  Once the tiers are determined, it will be 
important for them to be set for some time.  The placement of institutions in tiers should 
not be a source of continual political discussion.2 
 
 
                                                          
We suggest also that the system should have some flexibility regarding the across-
the-board subsidy for capital.   At present, institutions submit plans for new capital 
projects to the state in priority order.  The political process then determines which 
projects can be funded in a given year.  The uncertainty on the capital side associated 
with the timing of capital spending is at times more difficult for a college or university 
than the uncertainty in operating funds.  
 
2 There are three institutions in the Commonwealth that might be able to make a case for continuing to have 
a state appropriation as well as having their students eligible for tuition grants.  Norfolk State and Virginia 
State, the two historically black institutions in the state, currently receive higher than the average state 
appropriation per student.  This treatment is consistent with a recognition that the group of students these 
institutions educate is very expensive to deal with.  Virginia Military Institute also receives a higher than 
average state appropriation per student.  This is consistent with a very expensive educational model at a 
military academy.  We think that it would be appropriate to continue to treat these institutions differently 
than the others. 
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A state-allied institution might want to bring a building on line well before the 
political process would authorize it.  Because of this, state-allied institutions would be 
better off if they had the authority to undertake capital projects they could finance on 
their own. If the institution thinks that a new facility or a building renovation will 
significantly enhance the quality of the education it can offer, it might well make the 
decision to add the costs of financing the project to its tuition.  In other cases a state-
allied institution might well be willing to wait for the political process to determine the 
timing of capital spending.  Finally, there is no reason to think of capital projects as all or 
nothing.  The state and a state-allied institution could share the costs of a capital project.  
The state of Delaware routinely engages in this sort of cost sharing with the University of 
Delaware.  The important point here is that institutions should have the ability, if they can 
finance it, to control the pace of building on their campuses. 
 
Setting Tuition at a State-Allied College or University - Under the new plan a 
state-allied college or university would be free to set tuition as it saw fit.  When the new 
plan is inaugurated tuition would increase just as it has when the state reduced its general 
fund support in the past.  Since general fund support for operations is completely 
eliminated under the new plan, as our example above illustrated, the list-price tuition 
increase could be quite dramatic.  Yet it is important to note that the increase in net 
tuition -- the list-price tuition minus a student’s tuition grant -- would be very modest on 
average.  In fact, if the tuition grant turns out to be identical to an in-state student’s share 
of the general fund appropriation, there would be no change in net tuition.   
 
More likely, the new system would be inaugurated as part of a plan to reduce state 
expenditures, so the tuition grant would be less than an in-state student’s share of the 
general fund appropriation for operations.  As long as there were sufficient increases in 
state spending for need-based grants, access to higher education would not change.  The 
same set of students would be able to afford a higher education.  The major change is that 
the state would be providing a smaller average subsidy to Virginia students.   
 
One common objection to institutions gaining free control of tuition is that highly 
selective schools might be able to raise net tuition significantly.  As long as these schools 
agree to maintain current high percentages of in-state students, significant tuition hikes 
are unlikely.  There are a large number of in-state and out-of-state colleges and 
universities vying for Virginia's high quality students.  Ensuring a high quality student 
body is very important to college faculty and administrations.  To succeed in this 
competition, an institution has to present to students an appealing price/quality 
combination.  Under the new plan, because of the tuition grant, state-allied colleges and 
universities would maintain their current advantage in this competition compared to in-
state private institutions and out-of-state institutions.  A state-allied school that raised 
tuition too much would erode this advantage, and knowledge of this would provide a 
brake on any one institution’s desire to raise tuition. 
 
There are great advantages to institutions in moving to a system that allows them 
to set tuition with the understanding that this tuition forms a secure revenue base.  As we 
have argued, under such a system they could make much more realistic long-range plans 
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than they can when they are directly affected by the state budget roller coaster.  The 
effect of being dependent on state funds would be limited.  There would be no more 
uncertainty associated with changing state appropriations for operations.  Need-based 
grants could be a target of state budget cuts, but institutions could offset these if the cuts 
adversely affected the quality of the in-state applicant pool.3  There would still be some 
uncertainty about the timing of capital projects, but if the institution felt it could afford to 
accept some of the costs of these projects, it could limit this effect too.   
 
Under the new plan, budget uncertainties are shifted to the students through the 
size of the tuition grant.  The state could limit the adverse consequences of this type of 
uncertainty by fixing the size of the tuition grant by student cohort.  Under such a plan, 
the size of the tuition grant for first year college students would be set for those students 
for four years.  The next year’s first year students might have a different sized grant, but 
it too would be fixed for four years.  This way a student could have a better sense of what 
his or her state support would be for an entire college career.  We should hasten to add 
that the fact that students bear the brunt of the budget uncertainty is not a major change.  
Properly understood it is a change in timing only.  Suppose that the state reduces its 
budget for higher education the equivalent of $200 per student.  Under the existing 
system, in the year of the cut, the institutions will have to absorb the cut by reducing 
spending.  In the following year, the institutions will increase tuition, shifting the costs to 
students.  Under the new plan, the students feel the cut the first year as well as the second 
one.  The only difference is the timing. 
 
It is important to point out that the relationship between state support and college 
tuition would be changed considerably under the new plan.  Currently, when state support 
for operations is reduced, tuition increases.  Otherwise the institution has to cut the 
quality of its offerings or reduce the number of places for in-state students whose tuition 
in no way reflects the cost of their education.  Under the new plan, it is quite possible that 
just the reverse might happen.  If an institution holds its list-price tuition fixed, its net 
price would rise with a decrease in the tuition grant.  Importantly, however, the tuition 
revenue of the institution would not be affected.  There is no automatic need to increase 
tuition.  In some competitive situations, an institution might not be able to thrive with a 
higher net price for Virginia students.  Such an institution might choose to decrease its 
list-price tuition or at least moderate its planned increase.  Market pressures, based on the 
competition from other institutions, will strongly affect tuition.  
 
 
3. What the New Compact Is and What It Isn’t 
 
The new compact for state-allied colleges and universities is not a plan to 
privatize the current set of state-supported institutions.  The state-allied institutions would 
agree to keep the same in-state/out-of-state ratios for their student bodies that they 
currently have.  The Commonwealth of Virginia has an important interest in seeing that 
opportunities for a good higher education are available for the residents of Virginia.  The 
                                                          
3 To the extent that state-allied colleges and universities still tried to influence the state legislature, it would 
be in their best interest to try to lobby for increases in need-based aid. 
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Commonwealth has made major investments in college campuses around the state as well 
as continuing appropriations for operating funds to see that these educational 
opportunities are available.  This plan does not suggest that the Commonwealth is getting 
out of the higher education business.  It does, however, recognize that public funding for 
operating its higher education system is likely to decline as a share of the total cost of 
education.  This will mean that more of the cost of acquiring a higher education has to be 
borne by students.  The plan is an attempt to accommodate this trend by giving 
institutions more freedom to deal with the change. 
 
While the compact is not a privatization plan, it does provide for the colleges and 
universities some of the freedom enjoyed by private institutions.  For example, this plan 
redirects the activities of the supporters of the institutions in a productive way.  Currently, 
considerable time and effort are expended protecting the budget in Richmond.  Much of 
this lobbying is, in a polite way, part of a competition among the state-supported colleges 
and universities over a relatively fixed amount of money for higher education.  Such 
activity would not be necessary under the new plan – it replaces this political competition 
with market competition.  This frees up an institution’s lobbying efforts to be directed 
toward increasing its private fund raising.   
 
Private fund raising by state-supported institutions in Virginia has been a success 
story.  Loyal alumni and other supporters have provided funds that allow Virginia 
students to receive a world-class education at a cut-rate price.  This type of activity 
should be encouraged.  Public-private partnerships such as the state-allied institutions 
described here should be even more attractive to potential donors.  In the current 
situation, some donors feel that they are being asked to bail out the state, or that their 
donation will allow the state to cut the institution’s budget.  With the relationship 
between the state and its institutions clarified, such problems disappear.  As a separate 
legal entity, the state-allied institution also may become eligible for foundation support 
and grants unavailable to the traditional state-supported college or university. 
 
For the state-allied institutions to have the autonomy they need to compete, they 
must have more budget independence than currently exists.  College and university 
employees currently are state employees and receive some state-supported fringe 
benefits; most notably they are eligible for state retirement.  Budget autonomy need not 
hurt existing employees.  State-allied institutions could provide non-state retirement 
options for their employees while maintaining the state plans for those who prefer to 
remain within the state system.  In addition, as state agencies, colleges and universities 
are bound by some state restrictions in areas such as procurement.  The new plan would 
simply accelerate current plans to decentralize decision-making.  These changes should 
be encouraged in any event.  
 
This proposal is not a finished policy statement.  There are many details to be 
worked out.  Our hope is that this document will start a discussion.  The time is right.    
Slowly and haphazardly, state support for higher education clearly is diminishing.  
Inevitably this puts more of the burden of financing higher education on students.  We 
could be like Pollyanna and think that this trend will reverse itself, but we think it is 
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better to design a system that faces up to the long-term budget realities.  We think a 
system that shifts state funding from institutions to students and creates state-allied 
institutions with much more autonomy to manage their own affairs will allow higher 





 The two essential features of this plan are the creation of new legal entities that 
would control revenues from tuition and endowment funds, and making Virginia students 
the direct recipients of state grants for higher education.  These changes would give the 
schools and the state direct control over the types of decisions that are arguably the most 
appropriate for each to make.   
 
 Virginia’s colleges and universities would gain a predictable revenue stream for 
long-range planning and an enhanced ability to attract endowment funds and grants.  
Secure revenues would help ensure that the institutions could continue to offer a top-
quality education in a very competitive higher education market.  The power to set tuition 
still would be constrained by the market and by the continuing requirement to enroll a 
high percentage of in-state students.  A substantial in-state tuition discount likely would 
remain, this time determined by the schools themselves who would have to trade off the 
need for more revenue against the desire to maintain a high-quality and diverse set of in-
state students.   
 
 The state would control the size of its direct contribution to in-state students, and 
how that aid is allocated between need-based grants and across-the-board grants.  In a 
time of budget crisis, or in an environment in which other demands on state funding are 
rising in priority, the state could adjust its commitment to higher education without 
damaging the institutions that provide it.   
 
 If the new state-allied institutions are better off, and the state contribution to 
subsidizing higher education shrinks, who pays the cost of this reform plan?  Since the 
bulk of state aid currently consists of hidden across-the-board subsidies, this plan likely 
transfers some of the burden of funding higher education from the state to higher-income 
Virginia families.  In times of budget crisis, the most sensible place to cut higher 
education spending would be in the across-the-board portion of student grants.  If need-
based aid were spared, the burden of cuts would be concentrated on those who could 
most afford it. 
 
 Yet this burden shift likely will be mitigated by a number of important by-
products of the plan.  Vesting the state subsidy in students themselves will reduce the 
wasteful lobbying by colleges and universities over their share of the fixed state support 
budget.  Those same college resources will be redirected toward productive activities to 
increase private sector support.  Increased private support will reduce dependence on 
tuition revenue and enable schools to absorb more of the cost of providing their services. 
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 Getting off of the state funding roller coaster is essential if Virginia’s colleges and 
universities are to maintain or increase their quality relative to peer institutions 
elsewhere.  If schools control their own revenues and manage the type and timing of their 
capital projects they will be far better positioned to compete for the talented students and 
highly skilled professionals who determine their institution’s quality.  Enhancing that 
quality is another dividend that benefits all Virginia students regardless of their ability to 
pay.   
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